Donald Trump/Reuters
Just under a week has passed since the start of the Israeli and U.S. operation against Iran. The escalation temperature continues to rise, and the threat of the conflict expanding to the entire Middle East region and beyond is high. In other words, the situation is extremely uncertain and difficult to predict. But there is no doubt about one thing: if the United States and Israel were counting on a quick and low-cost operation, then the plan did not work. Now the question arises: what next? There is no doubt that the Iranians are prepared for a protracted war. But are the Americans ready to get bogged down in the quagmire of a military conflict?
After the operation in Venezuela, the U.S. President Donald Trump administration sent a signal: this is how issues should be resolved - swiftly, with minimal costs. But militarily, Iran is not Venezuela. What was the Americans' calculation? Plan A apparently aimed to disorient Iran's leadership through a few days of heavy bombing and targeted killings, sparking chaos and allowing internal opposition forces to finish the job. This plan, obviously, did not work. Tehran declared jihad and announced its readiness for a protracted war. The reaction of Iranian citizens, including the mass demonstrations held in the country in memory of the assassinated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, indicates an internal consolidation of society.
Plan B - the depletion of Iranian arsenals in the short term. This plan is currently in progress. However, things are not so simple here either. Washington and Tel Aviv are recording a decrease in the intensity of missile strikes from Iran, but opinions in expert communities on this matter vary: either the reserves are indeed being depleted, or Tehran is preparing for a protracted war and changing tactics.
But even if Iran's missile inventories are exhausted, the situation for the United States and Israel does not become more favorable. After all, the U.S. and Israeli armies are depleting their arsenals too, and the bombings are becoming increasingly costly. It is worth considering that the Iranian military is actively using cheap drones, which the Americans have to shoot down with expensive interceptor missiles.
What are Washington’s options in this scenario?
First, the Americans could press on with their air strikes, attempting to destroy everything within reach. The assumption, however, would be that the campaign against Iran is neither too long nor too costly. The other day, Trump stated that it would take Iran about ten years to recover after strikes by the USA and Israel. This argument could well serve as a starting point. The message would be that the main goals have been achieved: the adversary has been decapitated and disarmed, posing no threat to the USA for the next ten years.
This line of argument would probably sit well with the U.S. electorate, which views the events in Iran as “not their war.” However, this outcome would hardly satisfy Israel, for which Iran represents an existential threat, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserts. Therefore, Tel Aviv will evidently use all its influence on the USA to prevent Washington from withdrawing from the Iranian campaign.
Second, the USA will attempt to involve the countries of the Persian Gulf in the operation, whose territory has come under Iranian strikes due to the U.S. military installations located there. Statements claiming the right to retaliate against Iran have already been made by Gulf states. However, the leaders of the Middle East display iron restraint. They clearly understand that if they were to join the U.S.-Israeli coalition, their countries would turn into a battlefield – unlike the USA, which is located across the ocean.
Third, the USA will seek a proxy force that can be used against Iran. The previous administration of Joe Biden acted in a similar manner, using Ukraine as a proxy. Information is already emerging that the Americans are negotiating with the Iraqi Kurds. At the same time, Iranian Defense Council has warned of strikes on Kurdish groups if they violate the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In a situation where the United States itself cannot get involved in ground operations (which would result in significant human losses for the American army and a loss of political points for the Republicans ahead of the congressional elections), bringing in Kurdish forces would enable “ground fire” in addition to air strikes.
But this scenario is also flawed, and in two ways. “Unlike Israel and the USA, we were prepared for a protracted war, this is why time is on our side. Our actions on the battlefield took the enemy by surprise,” said Hamidreza Moghaddamfar, advisor to the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, elite units of the Iranian army), on 4 March.
There is no doubt that Iran will continue to resist. Nor is there any doubt that attacks on U.S. bases in the region and ships in the Strait of Hormuz will continue. If not with missiles, then with drones. And that means the region will continue to burn, and in this situation the Persian Gulf countries may demand a ceasefire not from Iran, but from the United States and Israel. We should not forget about the Lebanese Hezbollah, the confrontation with which forces the Israeli army to fight on two fronts, and the Yemeni Houthis, who have declared their readiness to defend Iran.
Fourthly, Washington may agree to negotiations with Iran. Trump has previously spoken about negotiations, although he referred to them exclusively as an initiative by Tehran (which the Iranians have denied). Meanwhile, Israel’s television’s Channel 12 reported that Tel Aviv suspects Donald Trump’s administration of conducting behind-the-scenes negotiations with Tehran on a ceasefire.
Right now it seems like the USA is going through all the scenarios above and possibly a range of other options in order to find the best one. But it is already clear that a military solution will not deliver a real victory for the Americans, but will only drag them, as Iran’s Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali put it, into the “quagmire” of conflict, from which they will not emerge unscathed.
After the operation in Venezuela, the U.S. President Donald Trump administration sent a signal: this is how issues should be resolved - swiftly, with minimal costs. But militarily, Iran is not Venezuela. What was the Americans' calculation? Plan A apparently aimed to disorient Iran's leadership through a few days of heavy bombing and targeted killings, sparking chaos and allowing internal opposition forces to finish the job. This plan, obviously, did not work. Tehran declared jihad and announced its readiness for a protracted war. The reaction of Iranian citizens, including the mass demonstrations held in the country in memory of the assassinated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, indicates an internal consolidation of society.
Plan B - the depletion of Iranian arsenals in the short term. This plan is currently in progress. However, things are not so simple here either. Washington and Tel Aviv are recording a decrease in the intensity of missile strikes from Iran, but opinions in expert communities on this matter vary: either the reserves are indeed being depleted, or Tehran is preparing for a protracted war and changing tactics.
What are Washington’s options in this scenario?
First, the Americans could press on with their air strikes, attempting to destroy everything within reach. The assumption, however, would be that the campaign against Iran is neither too long nor too costly. The other day, Trump stated that it would take Iran about ten years to recover after strikes by the USA and Israel. This argument could well serve as a starting point. The message would be that the main goals have been achieved: the adversary has been decapitated and disarmed, posing no threat to the USA for the next ten years.
This line of argument would probably sit well with the U.S. electorate, which views the events in Iran as “not their war.” However, this outcome would hardly satisfy Israel, for which Iran represents an existential threat, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserts. Therefore, Tel Aviv will evidently use all its influence on the USA to prevent Washington from withdrawing from the Iranian campaign.
Second, the USA will attempt to involve the countries of the Persian Gulf in the operation, whose territory has come under Iranian strikes due to the U.S. military installations located there. Statements claiming the right to retaliate against Iran have already been made by Gulf states. However, the leaders of the Middle East display iron restraint. They clearly understand that if they were to join the U.S.-Israeli coalition, their countries would turn into a battlefield – unlike the USA, which is located across the ocean.
Third, the USA will seek a proxy force that can be used against Iran. The previous administration of Joe Biden acted in a similar manner, using Ukraine as a proxy. Information is already emerging that the Americans are negotiating with the Iraqi Kurds. At the same time, Iranian Defense Council has warned of strikes on Kurdish groups if they violate the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In a situation where the United States itself cannot get involved in ground operations (which would result in significant human losses for the American army and a loss of political points for the Republicans ahead of the congressional elections), bringing in Kurdish forces would enable “ground fire” in addition to air strikes.
But this scenario is also flawed, and in two ways. “Unlike Israel and the USA, we were prepared for a protracted war, this is why time is on our side. Our actions on the battlefield took the enemy by surprise,” said Hamidreza Moghaddamfar, advisor to the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, elite units of the Iranian army), on 4 March.
There is no doubt that Iran will continue to resist. Nor is there any doubt that attacks on U.S. bases in the region and ships in the Strait of Hormuz will continue. If not with missiles, then with drones. And that means the region will continue to burn, and in this situation the Persian Gulf countries may demand a ceasefire not from Iran, but from the United States and Israel. We should not forget about the Lebanese Hezbollah, the confrontation with which forces the Israeli army to fight on two fronts, and the Yemeni Houthis, who have declared their readiness to defend Iran.
Fourthly, Washington may agree to negotiations with Iran. Trump has previously spoken about negotiations, although he referred to them exclusively as an initiative by Tehran (which the Iranians have denied). Meanwhile, Israel’s television’s Channel 12 reported that Tel Aviv suspects Donald Trump’s administration of conducting behind-the-scenes negotiations with Tehran on a ceasefire.
Right now it seems like the USA is going through all the scenarios above and possibly a range of other options in order to find the best one. But it is already clear that a military solution will not deliver a real victory for the Americans, but will only drag them, as Iran’s Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali put it, into the “quagmire” of conflict, from which they will not emerge unscathed.
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